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Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test
ANDREW BERG and CATHERINE PATTILLO*
This paper evaluates three models for predicting currency crises that were 
proposed before 1997. The idea is to answer the question: if we had been using
these models in late 1996, how well armed would we have been to predict the Asian 
crisis? The results are mixed. Two of the models fail to provide useful forecasts. One
model provides forecasts that are somewhat informative though still not reliable.
Plausible modifications to this model improve its performance, providing some
hope that future models may do better. This exercise suggests, though, that while
forecasting models may help indicate vulnerability to crisis, the predictive power of
even the best of them may be limited. [JEL F31, F47]
I
n recent years, a number of researchers have claimed success in systemati-
cally predicting which countries are more likely to suffer currency crises.
The Asian crisis has stimulated further work in this area, with several papers
already claiming to be able to “predict” the incidence of this crisis using pre-
crisis data.1
It may seem unlikely that it should be possible to systematically predict cur-
rency crises. It is reasonable to doubt that sharp and predictable movements in the
exchange rate are consistent with the actions of forward-looking speculators.
Early theoretical models of currency crises suggested, however, that crises may
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be predictable even with fully rational speculators.2 In “second-generation” mod-
els, a country may be in a situation in which an attack, while not inevitable,
might succeed if it were to take place; the exact timing of crises would be essen-
tially unpredictable. Even here, though, it may be possible to identify whether a
country is in a zone of vulnerability—that is, whether fundamentals are suffi-
ciently weak that a shift in expectations could cause a crisis. In this case, the rel-
ative vulnerability of different countries might predict the relative probabilities
of crises in response to a shock such as a global downturn in confidence in
emerging markets.3
It is one thing to say that currency crises may be predictable in general, how-
ever, and another that econometric models estimated using historical data on a
panel or cross section of countries can foretell crises with any degree of accuracy.
It is an open question whether crises are sufficiently similar across countries and
over time to allow generalizations from past experience. For example, models
estimated over countries without capital mobility may not work in a world of cap-
ital mobility.4 Moreover, many factors that may indicate a higher probability of
crisis, such as inadequate banking supervision or a vulnerable political situation,
are not easily quantified.
The possible endogeneity of policy to the risk of crisis may also limit the pre-
dictability of crises. For example, authorities within a country, or their creditors,
might react to signals so as to avoid crises.5 Policymakers are often fighting the
previous battle, so they are likely to respond to the most obvious indicators from
a previous crisis. On the other hand, a focus by market participants on a particu-
lar variable could result in its precipitating a crisis where one might not otherwise
have occurred.
The flurry of work between the 1994 and 1997 crises and the large number
of crises observed in 1997 provides an excellent opportunity to test existing state-
of-the-art “early warning systems” out of sample. The 1997 Asian crises that we
look at here present special challenges, however, on two grounds. First, many
analysts have argued that the causes of the Asian crises lie not in the traditional
macroeconomic fundamentals but rather in structural and microeconomic prob-
lems such as weak banking supervision, poor corporate governance, and even
corruption.6 Data on these are hard to come by, and the emphasis on these issues
is somewhat new, so the available empirical models focus rather on the typical
macroeconomic variables. This bodes ill for the predictability of the Asian crises
with these models. A contrasting line of thought, but also with pessimistic
2Krugman (1979). In this model, though, the exchange rate does not jump and indeed there are no
capital gains or losses of any sort at the point of crisis, so the relevance to the type of crises most people
have in mind may be limited.
3See Flood and Marion (1998) for a survey of this literature.
4Flood and Marion (1994) discuss and present some evidence on the predictability of currency crises
in capital-controlled developing economies.
5Initially successful early warning systems might thus cease to work following publication. This is a
version of the Lucas critique.
6Radelet and Sachs (1998a) emphasize the inability of fundamentals to explain the crises, while
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998b and 1998c) focus more on the structural and microeconomic expla-
nations. See Lane and others (1999) and Berg (1999) and references therein for overviews.implications for us, is that the Asian crises were largely “bank run” phenomena—
panic attacks against otherwise viable exchange rate regimes. This distinguishes
these crises from those emphasized in most of the empirical models, and suggests
that, at best, only a few variables that measure exposure to panicky capital out-
flows would be helpful predictors of crisis.7 When a crisis will strike would be
difficult or impossible to foretell.
On the other hand, the 1994 Mexico crisis, which was the immediate inspira-
tion for much of the recent work on crises, does not in many respects look that dif-
ferent from Thailand’s. Sachs (1997) argues that Thailand’s 1997 crisis “has the
same hallmarks [as the 1994 crisis]: overvaluation of the real exchange rate, cou-
pled with booming bank lending, heavily directed at real estate.” In any case, each
set of new crises always presents some new features, so the existence of some nov-
elty in the Asian crises does not invalidate them as tests of the models we consider.
Ultimately, the question of whether crises are predictable can only be settled
in practice. The recent work claiming success in predicting crises has focused
almost exclusively on in-sample prediction—that is, on formulating and estimat-
ing a model using data on a set of crises, and then judging success by the plausi-
bility of the estimated parameters and the size of the prediction errors for this set
of crises.8 The key test is not, however, the ability to fit a set of observations after
the fact, but the prediction of future crises. Given the relatively small number of
crises in the historical data, the danger is acute that specification searches through
the large number of potential predictive variables may yield spurious success in
“explaining” crises within the sample. The possibility that the determinants of
crises may vary importantly through time also suggests the importance of testing
the models out of sample. 
This paper evaluates three different models proposed before 1997 for predict-
ing currency crises. The idea is to try to answer the question: if we had been using
these models in late 1996, how well armed would we have been to predict the
Asian crisis? For each of the three models, we duplicate the original results as
closely as possible. We then reestimate the models using data through 1996, as
would have a researcher who at the end of 1996 aimed to predict crises the fol-
lowing year. We use two samples of countries: the same as the original paper, and
another common sample for purposes of comparing the three methods. We then
use the models to forecast events in 1997. We generate a ranking of countries
according to predicted probability or severity of crisis in 1997 for each model, and
then compare the predicted and actual rankings.
We chose the following three approaches based on their promise as early
warning systems, their potential applicability to the 1997 crises, and their success
within sample:
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7None of the precrisis models used a measure of short-term external debt relative to reserves, a vari-
able much emphasized by many advocates of the “bank run” interpretation of these crises, such as Radelet
and Sachs (1998b).
8Exceptions are Tornell (1998), discussed below, and Kaminsky (1998a), which, while it presents out-
of-sample estimates of the probability of currency crisis, does not provide tests of whether these forecasts
are better than, for example, guesswork. In addition, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) carry out an exercise sim-
ilar to ours. Their conclusions are largely consistent with our own, with some differences as noted below.• Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) (hereafter KLR) monitor a large set of
monthly indicators that signal a crisis whenever they cross a certain threshold.
This approach has the potential attraction that it produces thresholds beyond
which a crisis is more likely. This accords with the common practice of establish-
ing certain warning zones, such as current account deficits beyond 5 percent of
GDP or reserves less than three months of imports. The authors claim some suc-
cess in developing a set of indicators that reliably predict the likelihood of crisis.
Moreover, Kaminsky (1998a and 1998b) and Goldstein (1998) have asserted that
this method can be applied successfully to the 1997 crises.
• Frankel and Rose (1996) (FR) develop a probit model of currency crashes in a large
sample of developing countries. Their use of annual data permits them to look at vari-
ables, such as the composition of external debt, that are available only at that frequency.
• Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) (STV) restrict their attention to a cross section
of countries in 1995, analyzing the incidence of the “tequila effect” following the
Mexico crisis. They concentrate on a more structured hypothesis about the cause
of this particular episode, emphasizing interactions among weak banking systems,
overvalued real exchange rates, and low reserves. They claim to explain most of
the cross-country pattern of currency crisis in emerging markets in 1994–95. Their
approach has also been applied to analyzing the Asian crisis.9
I. Three Methods for Predicting Crises
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) Signals Approach
The Model
For KLR, a currency crisis occurs when a weighted average of monthly percentage
depreciations in the exchange rate and monthly percentage declines in reserves
exceeds its mean by more than three standard deviations.10 KLR propose the mon-
itoring of several indicators that may tend to exhibit unusual behavior during a 24-
month window prior to a crisis. They choose 15 candidate indicator variables based
on theoretical priors and on the availability of monthly data.11 An indicator issues
a signal whenever it moves beyond a given threshold level. 
Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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9Tornell (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998b), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a), and IMF (1998)
estimate variants of STV for 1997, all with some success.
10Weights are calculated so that the variance of the two components of the index are equal. See Berg
and Pattillo (1998) as well as KLR for further details regarding the methodology.
11Indicators are (1) international reserves in U.S. dollars; (2) imports in U.S. dollars; (3) exports in
U.S. dollars; (4) terms of trade; (5) deviations of the real exchange rate from a deterministic time trend
(in percentage terms); (6) the differential between foreign and domestic real interest rates on deposits; (7)
“excess” real M1 balances, where excess is defined as the residuals from a regression of real M1 balances
on real GDP, inflation, and a deterministic time trend; (8) the money multiplier of M2; (9) the ratio of
domestic credit to GDP; (10) the real interest rate on deposits; (11) the ratio of (nominal) lending to
deposit rates; (12) the stock of commercial bank deposits; (13) the ratio of broad money to gross interna-
tional reserves; (14) an index of output; and (15) an index of equity prices measured in U.S. dollars. The
indicator is defined as the annual percentage change in the level of the variable (except for the deviation
of the real exchange rate from trend, “excess” real M1 balances, and the three interest rate variables).We can consider the performance of each indicator in terms of the matrix at
right. Cell A represents the number of months in which the indicator issued a good
signal, B is the number of months in
which the indicator issued a bad signal
or “noise,” C is the number of months
in which the indicator failed to issue a
signal that would have been a good
signal, and D is the number of months
in which the indicator did not issue a
signal that would have been a bad sig-
nal. For each indicator, KLR find the “optimal” threshold, defined as that thresh-
old that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio B/A.12
The thresholds are calculated in terms of the percentiles of each country’s dis-
tribution for the variable in question. An optimal threshold for a given predictor,
such as domestic credit growth, might be 80, for example, meaning that a signal
is considered to be issued whenever domestic credit growth in a given country is
in the highest 20 percent of observations for that country. The optimal threshold is
constrained to be the same across countries. Thus, minimizing the noise-to-signal
ratio for the sample of countries yields an optimal threshold percentile for each
indicator that is the same for all countries. The corresponding country-specific
threshold value of the underlying variable associated with that percentile will dif-
fer across countries, however. 
The KLR approach is bivariate, in that each indicator is analyzed, and optimal
thresholds calculated, separately. Kaminsky (1998a) calculates a single composite
indicator of crisis as a weighted sum of the indicators, where each indicator is
weighted by the inverse of its noise-to-signal ratio. She then calculates a probability
of crisis for each value of the aggregate index by observing how often within the
sample a given value of the aggregate index is followed by a crisis within 24 months.
Table 1 presents an analog of a regression output for the KLR model, as esti-
mated in the in-sample period of 1970 to April 1995.13 The first column shows the
noise-to-signal ratio estimated for each indicator (defined as the number of bad
signals as a share of possible bad signals (B/(B+D)) divided by the number of
good signals as a share of possible good signals (A/(A+C)). Column 2 shows how
much higher is the probability of a crisis within 24 months when the indicator
emits a signal than when it does not (within sample). When the noise-to-signal
ratio is less than 1, this number is positive, implying that crises are more likely
when the indicator signals than when it does not. Indicators with noise-to-signal
ratios equal to or above unity are not useful in anticipating crises.









C D No signal 
was issued
12If the absence of a crisis within 24 months is considered the null hypothesis, then observations of
type B are Type I errors, while observations of type C are Type II errors. The procedure can be thought of
as minimizing the ratio of Type I errors, as a share of tranquil periods (B/(B+D)) to 1 – Type II errors as
a share of crisis periods (A/(A+C)).
13The in-sample period for the KLR model stops in April 1995 because of the 24-month prediction
window. A person implementing the KLR model in April 1997 (right before the Thai crisis) would estimate
the thresholds based on the performance of predictive variables measured only through April 1995, since
after that month it would be impossible to know (yet) whether a crisis was to occur within 24 months.We find eight indicators to be informative: deviations of the real exchange rate
from trend, the growth in M2 as a fraction of reserves, export growth, change in
international reserves, “excess” M1 balances, growth in domestic credit as a share
of GDP, the real interest rate, and the growth in the terms of trade.14
Predicting 1997
We have already calculated the optimal thresholds and resulting noise-to-signal
ratios for the different indicators. To forecast for the post-April 1995 period, we
Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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Table 1. Performance of Indicators—In-Sample
23-Country Sample, 1970–April 1995
Number of
Noise/signal P(crisis/signal) crises
(adjusted)a –P(crisis)b with data
Indicator (1) (2) (3)
Real exchange ratec 0.25 29 70
M2/reserves growth rate 0.39 17 68
Export growth rate 0.60 9 68
International reserves growth rate 0.44 15 68
Excess M1 balancesd 0.60 9 67
Domestic credit/GDP growth rate 0.78 4 65
Real interest rate 0.76 4 38
M2 multiplier growth rate 1.14 –2 68
Import growth rate 1.16 –2 68
Industrial production growth rate 1.14 –2 54
Terms of trade growth rate 0.93 1 55
Lending rate/deposit rate 1.04 –1 29
Bank deposit growth rate 1.63 –6 68
Stock price index growth rate 1.59 –6 44
Real interest differential 1.34 –4 38
Current account/GDP 0.42 16 70
M2/reserves (level) 0.45 14 51
aRatio of false signals (measured as a proportion of months in which false signals could have
been issued [B/(B+D)]) to good signals (measured as a proportion of months in which good signals
could have been issued [A/A+C)]). 
bP(crisis/signal) is the percentage of the signals issued by the indicator that were followed by
at least one crisis within the subsequent 24 months ([A/(A+C)] in terms of the matrix in the text).
P(crisis) is the unconditional probability of a crisis, (A+C)/(A+B+C+D).
cDeviation from deterministic trend.
dResidual from regression of real M1 on real GDP, inflation, and a deterministic trend.
14These indicators are also all informative in the KLR analysis. These results are quite similar to those
obtained by KLR with a different sample of countries and time period, though they found a further four indi-
cators to be informative. See the Appendix for more detail, as well as a full analysis of in-sample performance.apply these thresholds to the values of the predictive variables after this date,
determining whether they are issuing signals or not. The first column of Table 2
shows the performance of the Kaminsky (1998a) composite measures of the prob-
ability of crisis based on the weighted sum of indicators signaling.
A natural question is whether the estimated probability of crisis is above 50
percent prior to actual crises. The summary statistics rows show that only 4 per-
cent of the time was the predicted probability of crisis above 50 percent in cases
when there was a crisis within the next 24 months, during the period May 1995 to
December 1997. If we are more interested in predicting crises than predicting tran-
quil periods and are not so worried about calling too many crises, we may want to
consider an alarm to be issued when the estimated probability of crisis is above 25
percent. Table 2 shows that the estimated probabilities are above 25 percent in 25
percent of the precrisis observations. Sixty-three percent of alarms, however, are
false at the 25 percent cutoff.
This is not very good performance: most crises are missed and most alarms
are false. These forecasts are, nonetheless, better than random guesses, both eco-
nomically and statistically. The actual out-of-sample frequency of crisis following
an alarm (defined as an estimated probability above 25 percent) is 37 percent. The
frequency of crisis following periods without such alarms is 24 percent. And a c2
test of the goodness of fit results rejects at the 5 percent level of significance the
hypothesis that the number of successfully called crises is no higher than if the
warnings were uninformative.15
So far we have examined the ability of the model to predict the approximate
timing of crises for each country.16 We can also evaluate the cross-sectional suc-
cess of the models’ predictions in identifying which countries are vulnerable in a
period of global financial turmoil such as 1997. The question here is whether the
models assign higher predicted probabilities of crisis to those countries that had
the biggest crises. We can then evaluate forecast performance by comparing rank-
ings of countries based on the predicted and actual crisis indices. As we will see,
this also allows us to compare forecasts across models with different definitions of
crisis. Table 3 shows countries’actual crisis index and predicted probability of cri-
sis in 1997 for the various different forecasting methods.17 The table also shows
the Spearman correlation between the actual and predicted rankings and its asso-
ciated p-value, as well as the R2 from a bivariate regression of the actual rankings
on the predictions.
The KLR-based forecasts are somewhat successful at ranking countries by
severity of crisis. The forecasted probabilities are significantly correlated with the
actual rankings of countries in 1997 by their crisis index. They explain 28 percent
of the variance.
To get a richer sense of how useful this general approach would have been, we
now examine more closely the predictions of the KLR-based model for four Asian
ARE CURRENCY CRISES PREDICTABLE?
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15This is true for both the 50 percent and the 25 percent cutoff.
16We say approximate because the model only attempts to place the crisis within a 24-month window.
17The predicted crisis probability is the average of the probabilities during January to December 1996,
using the out-of-sample estimates. The actual crisis index used to rank the countries for 1997 is the max-
imum value of the monthly crisis index for each country during 1997.Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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Table 2. Goodness-of-Fit of KLR Model—Out of Sample
Cutoff of 50 Percent
Goodness-of-Fit Tablea
Augmented with current
Original specification account and M2/reserves
Actual Actual
Predicted Tranquil Crash Total Predicted Tranquil Crash Total
Tranquil 337 117 454 Tranquil 338 122 460
Crash 1 5 6 Crash 0 0 0
Total 338 122 460 Total 338 122 460
Summary Statistics
Original Augmented
p-value for c2 test of independence 0.002 No crisis called
Percent of observations correctly called 74 73
Percent of crises correctly calledb 4 0
Percent of tranquil periods correctly calledc 100 100
False alarms as a percent of total alarmsd 17 No crisis called
Probability of crisis given:
an alarme 83 No crisis called
no alarmf 26 27
Cutoff of 25 Percent
Goodness-of-Fit Tablea
Augmented with current
Original specification account and M2/reserves
Actual Actual
Predicted Tranquil Crash Total Predicted Tranquil Crash Total
Tranquil 286 91 377 Tranquil 279 83 362
Crash 52 31 83 Crash 59 39 98
Total 338 122 460 Total 338 122 460
Summary Statistics
Original Augmented
p-value for c2 test of independence 0.014 0.001
Percent of observations correctly called 69 69
Percent of crises correctly calledb 25 32
Percent of tranquil periods correctly calledc 85 83
False alarms as a percent of total alarmsd 63 60
Probability of crisis given:
an alarme 37 40
no alarmf 24 23
aTable shows number of observations.
bA precrisis period is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above the
cutoff probability and a crisis ensues within 24 months.
cA tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is below the
cutoff probability and no crisis ensues within 24 months. 
dA false alarm is an observation with an estimated probability of crisis above the cutoff (an
alarm) not followed by a crisis within 24 months.
eThis is the number of precrisis periods correctly called as a share of total predicted precrisis periods.
fThis is the number of periods where tranquility is predicted and a crisis actually ensues as a
share of total predicted tranquil periods (observations for which the predicted probability of crisis






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 crisis countries (where crisis is identified according to the KLR definition): Korea,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and one Asian and three Latin American non-
crisis countries: Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.18 Figure 1 presents
the KLR composite measure of estimated probability of crisis, with vertical lines
at crisis dates.
The KLR probability forecasts do not paint a clear picture of substantial risks
in crisis compared to noncrisis countries. Two (then) noncrisis countries, Brazil
and the Philippines, consistently present risks of crisis above 30 percent during
1996. One crisis country, Korea, also presents risks above 30 percent, though only
in the first half of the year, while Malaysia is generally above 20 percent.
Estimated crisis risks remain below 17 percent in 1996 for the crisis and noncrisis
countries Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand.
In sum, the KLR is a mixed success. The fitted probabilities from the weighted
sum of indicators are statistically significant predictors of crisis probability in
1997. Still, the overall explanatory power is fairly low, as demonstrated by the low
R2 statistic in the regression of the actual on the predicted crisis rankings and the
overall goodness of fit for the out-of-sample predictions.
Frankel and Rose (1996) Probit Model
The Model
FR estimate the probability of a currency crash using annual data for more than
100 developing countries from 1971–92, a much broader sample of countries
than the other two papers. The use of annual data may restrict the applicability of
the approach as an early warning system, but it permits the analysis of variables
such as the composition of external debt for which higher frequency data are
rarely available. FR test the hypothesis that certain characteristics of capital
inflows are positively associated with the occurrence of currency crashes: low
shares of FDI; low shares of concessional debt or debt from multilateral devel-
opment banks; and high shares of public-sector, variable-rate, short-term, and
commercial bank debt.19
Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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18These countries are an interesting but nonrandom subsample. We use them only to illustrate the con-
clusions from the broader sample.
19The complete list of variables is as follows. Domestic macroeconomic variables: (1) the rate of
growth of domestic credit, (2) the government budget as percent of GDP, (3) and the growth rate of real
GNP. Measures of vulnerability to external shocks include: (1) the ratio of total debt to GNP, (2) the ratio
of reserves to imports, (3) the current account as a percentage of GDP, and (4) the degree of overvalua-
tion, defined as the deviation from the average bilateral real exchange over the period. Foreign variables
are represented by (1) the percentage growth rate of real OECD output (in U.S. dollars at 1990 exchange
rates and prices), and (2) a “foreign interest rate” constructed as the weighted average of short-term inter-
est rates for the United States, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, with
weights proportional to the fractions of debt denominated in the relevant currencies. Characteristics of the
composition of capital inflows are expressed as a percentage of the total stock of external debt and include
(1) amount of debt lent by commercial banks, (2) amount that is concessional, (3) amount that is variable
rate, (4) amount that is public sector, (5) amount that is short-term, (6) amount lent by multilateral devel-
opment banks (includes the World Bank and regional development banks but not the International
Monetary Fund), and (7) the flow of FDI as a percentage of the debt stock.ARE CURRENCY CRISES PREDICTABLE?
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Indonesia Korea Probability Probability
Malaysia Mexico Probability Probability
Philippines Thailand Probability Probability
Note: The solid vertical lines represent crisis dates. The areas with dashed lines denote the 24 months
prior to crises.FR define a currency crash as a nominal exchange rate depreciation of at least
25 percent that also exceeds the previous year’s change in the exchange rate by at
least 10 percent. Thus, the type of currency crisis considered does not include
speculative attacks successfully warded off by the authorities through reserve sales
or interest rate increases. FR argue that it is more difficult to identify successful
defenses, since reserve movements are noisy measures of exchange market inter-
vention and interest rates were controlled for long periods in most of the countries
in the sample.
Table 4 (column 1) presents the FR benchmark probit regression, estimated
from 1970 through 1996 for purposes of forecasting 1997. The coefficients
reflect the effect of one-unit changes in regressors on the probability of a cur-
rency crash (expressed in percentage points) evaluated at the mean of the
data.20 We can conclude that the probability of a crisis increases when foreign
interest rates are high, domestic credit growth is high, the real exchange rate is
overvalued relative to the average level for the country, the current account
deficit and the fiscal surplus are large as a share of GDP, external concessional
debt is small, and FDI is small relative to the total stock of external debt.21
As noted in the Appendix, the in-sample goodness of fit of the FR model is
reasonably high.
Predicting 1997
The FR model estimated through 1996 can easily generate out-of-sample pre-
dictions for 1997. We cannot directly analyze goodness of fit for this model,
as there were no crisis countries in 1997 according to the FR definition.22
Instead, we can compare the predicted probabilities of crisis and actual values
of nominal exchange rate depreciation for 1997 for predictions based on model
1 of Table 4 (Table 3). Overall, the forecasts are not successful, with a corre-
lation of 33 percent. The fraction of the variance of the rankings accounted for
(measured by the R2) is 11 percent, and the prediction is not significant.23 In
sum, the FR model fails to provide much useful guidance on crisis probabili-
ties in 1997.
Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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20Thus, an increase in the degree of exchange rate overvaluation by 1 percentage point would increase
the estimated probability of crisis by 0.172 percentage points.
21This contrasts somewhat from the published FR results, particularly in the significance of the cur-
rent account and the real exchange rate and the insignificance of reserves/imports. These changes result
from several differences in specification. In addition to the inclusion of more recent years, the most impor-
tant changes were that we exclude countries with a population below 1 million or annual per capita GDP
below $1,000 and that we have fixed an error that resulted in a miscalculated real exchange rate measure.
See the Appendix for details. 
22This reflects the fact that the use of annual frequency does not work well here; because the
devaluations happened toward the end of the year, none of the Asian countries are identified as crisis
countries in 1997. 
23This correlation is based on the 13 countries for which data are available that are part of the 23-
country common sample. Based on the full sample where data are available (25 out of the 41 countries
included in model 3A of Appendix Table A3), the forecasts are even less successful.ARE CURRENCY CRISES PREDICTABLE?
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Table 4. Frankel and Rose: Probit Estimates of Probability 
of a Currency Crash, 1970–96
Model 1 Model 2
FR specification Modified
dF/dx |z|a dF/dx |z|a
Commercial bank share of total debt 0.022 0.1 0.121 1.0
Concessional share –0.296 –2.3 ** –0.305 –3.3 ***
Variable rate share 0.020 0.1 –0.089 –0.6
Short-term share 0.106 0.6 0.161 1.1
FDI/debt –0.795 –2.5 ** –0.576 –1.8 *
Public sector share 0.212 1.7 * 0.247 2.4 **
Multilateral share 0.021 0.1 0.045 0.4
Debt/GNP –0.025 –0.5 0.021 0.6
Reserves/imports –0.007 –1.3
Reserves/M2 –0.206 –3.5 ***
Current account/GDP –0.697 –2.4 ** –0.679 –2.8 ***
Overvaluationb 0.172 2.9 *** 0.107 2.4 **
Government budget surplus/GDP 0.767 2.6 *** 0.595 2.6 **
Domestic credit growth 0.182 4.4 *** 0.119 3.1 ***
GDP growth rate –0.058 –0.9 –0.017 –0.3
Foreign interest rate 1.007 2.0 ** 0.909 2.3 **
Northern (OECD) growth 0.414 0.4 0.033 0.0
Open –0.239 –4.1 ***
Sample size 464 448
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.32
Goodness of Fit
Model 1 Model 2
Actual
Tranquil Crash Total Tranquil Crash Total
Cutoff probability of 50 percentc
Predicted tranquility 398 50 448 381 40 421
Predicted crash 6 10 16 7 20 27
Total 404 60 464 388 60 448
Cutoff probability of 25 percentd
Predicted tranquility 373 34 369 342 22 369
Predicted crash 31 26 57 41 38 79
Total 404 60 426 383 60 448
aOne, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
bDefined as the deviation from the average real exchange rate over the period.
cA crisis is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above 50 percent if a cri-
sis ensues within 24 months. A tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of
crisis is below 50 percent and there is no crisis within 24 months.
dA crisis is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above 25 percent if a cri-
sis ensues within 24 months. A tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of
crisis is below 25 percent and there is no crisis within 24 months.Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) Cross-Country Regressions
The Model
STV analyze the impact of Mexico’s financial crisis of December 1994 on other
emerging markets in 1995. They examine the determinants of the magnitude of the
currency crisis in a cross section of 20 countries in 1995. This approach cannot
hope to shed light on the timing of crises. Rather, it may answer the question of
which countries are most likely to suffer serious attacks in the event of a change
in the global environment. This approach is potentially attractive, even for our pur-
poses, for a number of reasons. First, the timing may be much harder to predict
than the incidence of a crisis across countries. Moreover, the determinants of cri-
sis episodes may have varied importantly over time. STV can impose more eco-
nomic structure on their analysis by focusing on a particular set of crises (those
occurring at one time). STV argue that a key feature of the 1995 crises was that
the attacks hit hard only at already vulnerable countries. In a rational panic,
investors identify a country as being likely to suffer from a large devaluation in the
face of an outflow, and validate their own concerns by fleeing the country. Thus,
countries with overvalued exchange rates and weak banking systems were subject
to more severe attacks, but only if they had low reserves relative to monetary lia-
bilities (so that they could not easily accommodate the capital outflow) and weak
fundamentals (so that fighting the attack with higher interest rates would be too
costly).
The original STV model was not designed to predict future crises but rather to
explain events in 1995. For our purposes, it is important for the crises that affected
mostly Asian countries in 1997 to have been broadly similar to the 1995 crises.
And in fact a number of researchers have argued since 1997 that the two sets of
crises share many characteristics. Radelet and Sachs (1998a) argue that the 1997
and 1995 crises shared important characteristics, though their interpretation of
post-Thailand Asian crises relies more heavily on contagion effects. The IMF
(1998) argues that the STV results apply to the Asian crisis and constructs a com-
posite indicator of crises on that basis. Radelet and Sachs (1998b), Tornell (1998),
and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a) also apply models in the STV spirit to
both sets of crises. 
Tequila Crisis Models
STV define a crisis index (IND) as the weighted sum of the percent decrease in
reserves and the percent depreciation of the exchange rate, from November 1994
to April 1995. They argue that countries had more severe attacks when their bank-
ing systems were weak (proxied by a lending boom variable (LB) measuring
growth in credit to the private sector from 1990 through 1994) and when the
exchange rate was overvalued (measured as the degree of depreciation from
1986–89 to 1990–94 (RER)). Moreover, they find that these factors only matter for
countries with low reserves (DLR), measured as having a reserves/M2 ratio in the
lowest quartile, and “weak fundamentals” (DWF), which means having RER in the
lowest three quartiles or LB in the highest three quartiles. 
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INDi= b1 + b2RERi + b3LBi + b4RERi • DLRi + b5LBi • DLRi + 
b6RERi • DWFi + b7LBi • DWFi + ei.
Regression 1 of Table 5 reproduces the original STV benchmark regression,
using their data.24 The results emphasized by STV are, first, that the effect of RER
is significantly negative for countries with low reserves and weak fundamentals
(the sum of estimates of b2 + b4 + b6 is negative), and the effect of LB is signifi-
cantly positive for these same countries (the sum of estimates of b3 + b5 + b7 is
positive). They take the high R2 of the regression (0.69) to indicate that the model
explains the pattern of contagion well.
To apply this model to the 1997 crises, we run the model over the original
STV sample (row 2 of Table 5) as well as the same sample of 23 countries to
which we apply the KLR approach (row 3). The regression coefficients change
substantially. The STV hypotheses now receive only mixed support. For example,
when revised data are used (row 2), the effect of RER with low reserves and weak
fundamentals (b2 + b4 + b6) is now insignificantly different from zero, while the
coefficient on LB with low reserves (b3 + b5) increases significantly.
The fragility of the STV results with respect to the data revisions that have
taken place since their estimations and to the addition of three countries to the
sample casts some doubt on the usefulness of this specification for the Asian
crises. We nonetheless generate predictions for 1997 based on these estimates
drawn from the Tequila crisis. 
Predicting 1997
To implement the STV model for 1997, we mechanically update the STV vari-
ables and apply the coefficients from the STV regressions for the Tequila crisis to
obtain predicted values for the 1997 crises. For the dependent variable that mea-
sures the severity of the crisis, we measure percent depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate from April 1997 through December 1997. For the explanatory vari-
ables, we move all the definitions forward two years. We then calculate forecasts
of devaluation using the coefficient estimates from the STV benchmark specifica-
tion estimated for the Tequila crisis. 
Column 7 of Table 3 shows the country rankings based on the actual value of
the crisis index for 1997, defined, analogously to STV, as the change in the nom-
inal exchange rate between April and December 1997. Column 8 presents country
rankings based on applying the coefficients from the STV regression estimated
over the 23-country sample to the updated LB and RER variables and associated
dummy variables. 
STV themselves try many variants of their benchmark regression, in their case
to demonstrate robustness. For example, the STV definition in terms of the aver-
age level of the real exchange rate in the 1990 through 1994 period divided by the
ARE CURRENCY CRISES PREDICTABLE?
121














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.average level during 1986 through 1989 clearly has an arbitrary element, and they
also try other measures, such as the percent change in the real exchange rate from
1990 to 1994.
None of these forecasts performs well. The most successful specification,
based on Table 5, regression 4, employs one of the alternative definitions of RER.
Its forecast rankings of crisis severity are insignificant predictors of the actual rank-
ings and explain only 5 percent of the variance of the actual country rankings.25
A recent paper (Tornell, 1998) may seem to contradict the results in this paper.
Tornell estimates a model very similar to STV, stacking observations from the
1994/95 crisis and the 1997 crisis. He finds that his new model: (1) fits fairly well,
with significant coefficients plausibly signed; (2) has coefficients that appear sta-
ble between the two sets of crises; and (3) when fitted with the 1994 observations
only and forecasting for 1997, produces good predictions, much better than the
STV forecasts examined here and comparable to the KLR-weighted sum of
indicators-based probabilities.
Rather than providing a counterexample to the results presented here, this
effort illustrates the importance of testing models out of the sample used to for-
mulate them, as we do here. A variety of apparently small modifications charac-
terizes the difference between the specification in STV and Tornell (1998), and yet
these respecifications apparently make the difference between success and failure
in predicting the incidence of the 1997 crises “out of sample.”26
This suggests that specification uncertainty can be as important as parameter
uncertainty across crisis episodes, at least for techniques such as STV that rely on
a small number of observations and relatively complex models. Only the applica-
tion of models to episodes that postdate the design of the model provides an appro-
priately tough test. Unfortunately for our purposes, the apparent need for a
separate specification search for the new set of crises casts some doubt on the use-
fulness of this sort of approach for predicting future crises.
II. Do Additional Variables Help?
We have seen that even the most successful of the models under consideration
(KLR) has fairly low explanatory power. None of these papers was meant to be
the last word on forecasting, however, so it is reasonable to ask whether it would
have been possible to do better with some relatively minor modifications. We
have already corrected some errors in the previous versions, as would anyone
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25In light of this predictive failure, we have also considered a much less ambitious test of the STV
model, justified by the idea that we may reasonably expect some constancy of the general model of crisis
episodes even if parameter constancy fails to hold. It turns out, however, that even when reestimated using
1996 and 1997 data to explain the 1997 results, the STV model applied to the 1997 crisis meets with little
success. The results vary strongly depending on the exact specification, but the fit is always poor. Compared
with its application to the 1994 crisis, the coefficients are economically and statistically different, and the
explanatory power of the regressions is much lower. Naturally, the in-sample results for 1997 are superior
to the out-of-sample predictions we have already analyzed. It is remarkable, though, that the STV regres-
sion reestimated with 1997 data performs somewhat worse than the KLR out-of-sample forecasts.
26Bussière and Mulder (1999) confirm this conclusion. They find that the Tornell (1998) model per-
forms poorly at predicting 1998 crises.implementing them in early 1997. We have also looked at robustness to alternate
samples and, in the case of STV, to changes in the definition of some of the
explanatory variables. Here, though, we go one step further and ask whether the
addition of some plausible right-hand-side variables would have greatly
improved the performance of the models. To some extent we are, then, deviating
here from the approach of testing “pure” out-of-sample forecasts.
KLR omitted several variables that even prior to 1997 were clearly identified
in the literature as important potential determinants of crisis, most notably the level
of the ratio of M2 to reserves and the ratio of the current account to GDP. KLR used
the rate of growth of M2/reserves, but most discussions of crisis vulnerability even
then focused on the level of this variable. KLR did not use the current account. We
find that in the KLR framework both the level of M2/reserves and the ratio of the
current deficit to GDP are highly informative over the in-sample period, as Table 1
shows.27 As shown in the second column of Table 2, the KLR model augmented
with these two additional variables performs noticeably better out-of-sample than
the original model. For example, 32 percent of the precrisis observations are called
correctly at the 25 percent cut-off, compared with 25 in the original model. In the
rank correlation test, the augmented model’s predictions are more highly correlated
with the actual ranking of crises, with a correlation coefficient of 0.60 compared
with 0.54 for the original model (columns 2 and 3 of Table 3).
For the FR model, we also tried alternative explanatory variables, all estimated
using data through 1996. We saw in the original FR specification that the ratio of
reserves to imports does not seem to matter. Measuring reserves as a ratio to short-
term external debt and to broad money (M2) have both been suggested as alterna-
tive ways of measuring the adequacy of reserves.28 We find that both the ratio of
reserves to short-term external debt and that of reserves to M2 are separately sig-
nificant predictors of crisis. When all three reserve ratios are included, the ratio of
reserves to M2 is significant at the 1 percent level, while the ratio of reserves to
short-term external debt is significant at the 10 percent level. The ratio of reserves
to imports is insignificant and wrongly signed. The degree of openness of the
economy may indicate the flexibility of the adjustment mechanism in the country
and hence the probability of crisis. We find that more open economies, as mea-
sured by the share of exports and imports in GDP, were significantly less likely to
suffer a crisis.29 Changes in the terms of trade had no apparent impact on the like-
lihood of crisis, while measuring the debt composition variables as a share of GDP
rather than total debt also had no effect. Interacting short-term external debt with
credit growth, in the spirit of STV, also did not help predict crises.
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27The current account is measured as a moving average of the previous four quarters. We use our
interpolated monthly GDP series to form the ratio of the current account to the moving average of GDP
over the same period.
28See Calvo and Mendoza (1996) on Mexico for an emphasis on the ratio of M2 to reserves and
Radelet and Sachs (1998a) on the Asian crises for a focus on short-term external debt/reserves. The inclu-
sion of the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt is particularly in violation of the out-of-sample
spirit of this paper, as most of the interest in this variable postdates the Asian crises.
29Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) make this argument and include this variable in a similar regres-
sion with some success.As a result of this specification search, regression 2 of Table 4 includes the ratio
of reserves to M2 and the degree of openness of the economy. These additions do
not help performance in 1997, as shown in column 6 of Table 3, which shows that
the correlation of predicted and actual rankings of crises in 1997 is still small and
insignificantly different from zero.
We did not attempt to add variables to the STV model, partly because the
small sample size renders the exercise particularly prone to data mining and also
because STV themselves consider and reject the main alternative candidate
explanatory variables. We noted above that we have investigated a variety of dif-
ferent specifications suggested by STV themselves, without success.
III. Is It Fair to Compare Such Different Models?
We have judged these models based on their forecasting performance. Only the
KLR model was designed explicitly with this objective in mind, and so it is per-
haps not surprising that it is the most successful. However, FR is also a panel-
based approach, and it is a reasonable test of the model to ask how well it fits in
more recent years. And the value of the STV model depends in part on its appli-
cability to crises in general, not just to those over which it was estimated.30
We have analyzed and compared results from three models that differ in critical
ways. Most fundamentally, they are models with different crisis definitions—that is,
dependent variables—and different samples. Since each model is forecasting some-
thing different, the comparison of typical statistics such as the R2 is not helpful. We
have therefore relied on goodness of fit, where applicable, and more generally on the
rank correlation of predicted probabilities and actual incidence of crisis in 1997 in
assessing the models.31
It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that success has different meanings
for each of the models. For STV, it would imply that the relative severity of crisis
was predictable, given the time period during which attacks might be expected to
occur. KLR (and even more so FR, because of the shorter forecast interval)
attempt as well the more ambitious task of predicting the timing of crises. It is per-
haps surprising that KLR achieves some success at both ranking (as measured by
the correlations of predicted and actual for 1997) and timing, as measured by the
goodness-of-fit statistics. 
The three models embody different definitions of crisis. STV and KLR agree
on looking at a crisis index that combines information on reserve losses and
exchange rate depreciations, on the grounds that they are trying to measure pres-
sure on the exchange regime, whether it results in a devaluation or not. FR mea-
sure only the exchange rate, though largely on the practical grounds that data on
reserve changes are noisy. FR and KLR choose to look for discrete crises defined
as extreme values of the underlying index. This approach may be justified on the
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30Many have tried to apply the model to other crises, as mentioned in footnote 9. 
31For the same reason, it is also not helpful to directly compare probabilities of crisis across models.
Where the crisis events are more common, the unconditional probabilities, and hence the mean forecast
probabilities in an unbiased model, are higher. grounds that crises represent a structural break in the behavior of the exchange rate
and reserves compared to other times; the models are attempting, then, to predict
the breaks, not the behavior in between. STV do not predict crises as discrete
events; rather, they try to predict the severity of crises as measured by the percent
change in a crisis index over a particular period.
Different crisis definitions yield different results, and all operational definitions
of crisis contain measurement error in that they only imperfectly capture whatever
we have in mind by currency crises.32This may worsen the performance of the mod-
els, though it may mean that they “really” work better than reported, in that some of
the false alarms or missed crises may have been due to measurement error of the
dependent variable. We have not explored this issue here.
The models in their original forms were estimated over quite different sam-
ples: FR used the broadest possible sample of developing countries over 22 years;
STV estimated over only a cross section of “emerging markets”—that is, countries
in the IFC database—at a particular time characterized by contagion and crisis;
and KLR included an eclectic mix of developing and developed countries, the
latter in particular chosen partly because they had crises, over 25 years. We have
to some extent tested whether these differences in sample were important, by
reestimating the models over the original and over a common sample. We have
found that the KLR results were fairly robust to this change, though we find fewer
indicators to be informative. The FR specification changed in some important
ways with the restriction of the sample.33 The STV results turned out to be most
fragile to changes in sample, both over the original time period and also with
respect to future crisis episodes. It turns out, though, that this variation in perfor-
mance of the STV and FR models across samples did not matter along one impor-
tant dimension: in no case did the out-of-sample forecasts predict crises well.
The models forecast over different time horizons. FR and STV forecast
roughly one year out, while KLR considers an alarm to be correct if a crisis hap-
pens any time within a 24-month window. This difference is not responsible for
the superior performance of the KLR model, as it performs about as well when
attempting to forecast crises 12 months ahead rather than 24.
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) apply the KLR methodology to predicting the Asian
crisis and, while they do not systematically evaluate the results, conclude that it does
not work well, noting some success but many false positives. They dismiss what
success they do observe largely on the argument that the method of measuring pre-
dictive variables in terms of percentiles is biased in favor of predicting crises in
countries that have previously had little volatility in predictive variables. For exam-
ple, even relatively small real exchange rate appreciation results in a large percentile
deviation in historically tranquil countries, such as the Asian crisis countries. We
find this argument uncompelling. There are many reasons why measures that com-
pare variables to their own history may pick up important trends efficiently.34
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32See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) on sensitivity to alternative crisis definitions in the FR model.
33See the Appendix for details. 
34A doctor may well ask whether a patient has lost weight, not how his weight compares to the stan-
dard charts, when looking for signs of sickness. (We thank Joseph Stiglitz for this analogy.)Ultimately, the question is empirical. In fact, the KLR model does not tend to sys-
tematically overpredict crises in-sample in relatively tranquil countries.
The models analyzed in this paper are, with the partial exception of STV,
reduced form and nonstructural. An alternative approach is to estimate a well-
defined structural model. Blanco and Garber (1986) estimate a model of currency
crisis probability for Mexico that achieves some success. The results of this sort
of model are hard to compare with those we consider here. First, their results are
essentially a special case, in that they fit a specific structural model. The first-
generation model they estimate, with excess domestic credit creation driving a
crisis, is more plausibly applied to the specific crises they consider (Mexico’s in
the 1970s and 1980s) than in many other cases. Their estimation depends on
using the interest rate differential as a measure of expected devaluation. The
empirical relevance of this assumption is doubtful, despite its plausibility.35
Moreover, they estimate only one period ahead, a horizon that may be of limited
use for policymakers.36
IV. Conclusion
We have examined the extent to which models formulated and estimated prior to
1997 would have helped predict the 1997 currency crises. The exercise is thus “out
of sample” both in the sense that we estimate the models using data only through
1996 and, equally important, in that the models themselves were specified prior to
1997. The results of this unusually tough test are generally though not unambigu-
ously negative. Two of the three models (STV and FR) provide forecasts that are
no better than guesswork. Ex ante plausible variations in sample and specification
did not change this result. 
The KLR model, in contrast, achieved a measure of success. The probabilities
of crisis it generated during the period May 1995 to December 1996 were statisti-
cally significant predictors of actual crisis incidence over the subsequent 24
months. Moreover, its forecasted cross-country ranking of severity of crisis is a
significant predictor of the actual ranking. This success should not be exaggerated.
The model does not explain a large part of the actual variation in outcomes. When
this model issued an alarm during the May 1995 to December 1996 period, a cri-
sis would actually have followed in 1997 37 percent of the time.37 This compares
with a 27 percent unconditional probability of crisis in 1997. And the model
explains only 28 percent of the variation in actual crisis rankings.
We also tried adding various explanatory variables to the models. Plausible
modifications to the STV and FR models did not yield useful forecasts, even
some, such as the inclusion of short-term external debt, actually inspired by
events in 1997. The addition of two variables to the KLR model that were widely
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35The interest differential did not signal an expected exchange rate change in advance of Mexico’s
1994 crisis, as Werner (1996) discusses.
36Their estimated probabilities of crisis are generally somewhat lower than those of KLR largely
because they are trying to predict a much rarer event than KLR (a crisis next month, as opposed to a cri-
sis sometime within the next 24 months).
37An alarm here is defined as a predicted probability above 25 percent.considered good indicators prior to 1997—the level of the current account bal-
ance and M2/reserves—improves performance somewhat.
The answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is thus “yes, but not
very well.” The answer is “yes” since the KLR forecasts, and even more so the
modified model, are clearly better than a naive benchmark of pure guesswork. We
say “not very well” because even the KLR model issues more false alarms than
accurate warnings, while it misses most crises. 
We have judged the forecasts of these models against a naive alternative of pure
guesswork, and the statistically significant results do not imply that the KLR model
does better than the analysis of informed observers. Systematic comparisons
against alternative benchmarks would be interesting. It is not easy to find more
challenging comparators, however. First, ratings agencies such as Moody’s did not
warn markets against the East Asian crises of 1997.38 Goldfajn and Valdés (1998)
show that exchange rate expectations of currency traders do not help predict crises.
And there is little evidence that interest differentials systematically predict crises.39
The out-of-sample comparison of different approaches provides some insight
into important issues in the empirical modeling of currency crises. We have found
that reestimating the panel-based KLR and FR models over different samples of
countries and longer time periods has preserved most of the economically impor-
tant results. The STV model has proved largely unstable. More recent efforts to
apply STV-like models to the Asian crises have met with some success. While this
may help explain the crisis, it seems that the approach of carefully fitting a small
set of crises is not promising as a way to predict the next round. To put it another
way, specification uncertainty appears to be as important as parameter uncertainty
for STV-type approaches, which represent a more complex specification fitted to
many fewer observations. 
We have also shed some light on the styled facts about crises. All three
approaches demonstrate that the probability of a currency crisis increases when
domestic credit growth is high, the real exchange rate is overvalued relative to
trend, and the ratio of M2 to reserves is high. Both FR and KLR also suggest that
a large current account deficit is an important risk factor.40 These conclusions
imply that elements of both first- and second-generation models are relevant:
M2/reserves would seem to play a more important role in second-generation mod-
els of crisis that emphasize multiple equilibria, while the other variables are more
suggestive of traditional first-generation models.
Where do we go from here? In this paper we have seen that the addition of
some plausible variables improves performance of the KLR model somewhat. In
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38After years of stable or increasing ratings, the first downgrade in the Asian crisis countries was a
negative outlook in Thailand in February 1997 (Moody’s). The rest were not downgraded until mid- to
late 1997. See Adams and others (1998).
39The nominal interest differential alone does not predict crises well in our sample of countries. In a
bivariate probit regression (not shown), the nominal interest differential is statistically significant, but the
goodness of fit is much worse than for the KLR model we have considered, and the out-of-sample fore-
casts are not helpful. The real interest differential does worse still.
40The real exchange rate and the current account are not significant in the original FR specification,
as discussed in the Appendix.a related paper, we depart from the entire “indicators” methodology that looks for
discrete thresholds and calculates signal-to-noise ratios.41 Instead, we apply a pro-
bit regression technique to the same data and crisis definition as in KLR. In the
process we test some of the basic assumptions of the KLR approach. Specifically,
we embed the KLR approach in a multivariate probit framework in which the inde-
pendent variable takes the value of one if there is a crisis in the subsequent 24
months and zero otherwise. These probit models provide generally better forecasts
than the KLR models. In the process, we find also that the data do not generally
support one of the basic ideas of the KLR indicator approach: that it is useful to
interpret predictive variables in terms of discrete thresholds, the crossing of which
is particularly significant for signaling a crisis.
A variety of specification issues appear worth exploring, particularly in the
context of probit-based models estimated on panel data. We can be confident that
future papers will predict past crises. This exercise suggests, though, that while
crisis forecasting models may help indicate vulnerability, the predictive power of
even the best of them may be limited.
APPENDIX
Issues in Reestimation and In-Sample Results
In the text we present the KLR, FR, and STV models estimated with a common sample, and
analyze the success of the out-of-sample predictions for 1997. This appendix fills in some of
the steps. First, we discuss issues involved in the reestimation of the models, including the
effects of updating the estimation period, changing the sample, fixing any errors in the original
estimates, and using more recently available and hence revised data. Second, we evaluate the
in-sample performance of the models.
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) Signals Approach
We first reproduce the KLR results using the same 20-country, 1970–95 sample they use.42 Our
results are broadly similar to those of KLR, though column 1 of Table A1 shows slightly weaker
performance than reported by KLR for most of the indicators. Differences are starker for four
indicators, for which KLR find a noise-to-signal ratio substantially below unity while we find
a ratio above unity. Thus, although KLR find 12 informative indicators—that is, those with
noise-to-signal ratios below unity—we find only 8 of these to be informative.43
Next, we modify the sample in two ways. First, we estimate only through April 1995.
This reflects the information available to the analyst just before the Thai crisis of July 1997,
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41See Berg and Pattillo (1998 and 1999).
42Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia,
Mexico, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
43There are a number of possible reasons for the differences in results. We have found that our imple-
mentation of the KLR definition of crisis results in a set of crisis dates that do not fully match the KLR
crisis dates as reported in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Specifically, we fail to match 14 out of 76 KLR
crises. Some of this discrepancy may come from differences in the raw data. We have found that seem-
ingly small differences due to revisions in International Financial Statistics (IFS) data can strongly influ-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.since the evaluation of an observation requires knowing whether there will be a crisis within
24 months. Second, we change the sample of countries: we omit the five European countries
from the sample and add other emerging market economies. This sample is more appropriate
for our concern with crises in “emerging markets” and also serves as an informal test of
robustness of the KLR approach.44 Table 1 in the text shows that indicator performance over
the larger sample is broadly similar to results using the KLR sample. The average noise-to-
signal ratio falls a little for the informative indicators in the 23-country sample (as well as for
the entire set of indicators).
So far we have looked at each indicator separately. Following Kaminsky (1998a), we next
calculate the weighted-sum-based probabilities of crisis.45 This produces a series of estimated
probabilities of crisis for each country. These should be interpreted as the predicted probability
of crisis within the next 24 months, based on the (weighted) number of indicators signaling in
a given month.46
How good are these in-sample forecasts in predicting crises during January 1970 to April
1995? For zero/one dependent variables, it is natural to ask what fraction of the observations
are correctly called. A cutoff level for the predicted probability of crisis is defined such that a
crisis is predicted if the estimated probability is above this threshold. The resulting goodness-
of-fit data are shown in the first two columns of Table A2 for two cutoffs: 50 percent and 25
percent.47
What can we conclude? The first column of Table A2 displays the goodness-of-fit mea-
sures for the KLR weighted-sum-based probabilities, using the original specification and our
new sample. The model correctly calls most observations at the 50 percent cutoff, almost
entirely through correct prediction of tranquil periods (i.e., those that are not followed by crises
within 24 months). Almost all (91 percent) of the crisis months (i.e., observations followed by
a crisis within 24 months) are missed. Even with so few crisis observations correctly called, 44
percent of alarms (i.e., observations where the predicted probability of crisis is above 50 per-
cent) are false, in that no crisis in fact ensues within 24 months. Next, we add the two new vari-
ables, current account and M2/reserves in levels. As the second column of Table A2 shows, the
addition of these variables only modestly improves the performance of the KLR-based proba-
bilities. A c2 test rejects the null that the forecasts and actual outcomes are independent at the
1 percent level.
With a lower cutoff of 25 percent, 41 percent of crisis observations are correctly called by
the original KLR model. The probability of a crisis within 24 months is now 37 percent if there
is an alarm, much higher than the unconditional probability of crisis of 16 percent in this sam-
ple. Now, however, 63 percent of alarms are false. A c2 test also rejects the null that the fore-
casts and actual outcomes are independent at the 1 percent level here.
Our analysis of the in-sample success of the KLR-type models suggests that the
approach can indeed be useful and the model does significantly better than guesses based on
the unconditional probability of crisis. Nonetheless, most crises are still missed and most
alarms are false.
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44We add the following to the 15 KLR emerging market economies: India, Jordan, Korea, Pakistan,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province of China, and Zimbabwe.
45Two issues regarding the treatment of missing data in the KLR framework deserve mention. A key
variable is c24, which is defined to equal one if there is a crisis in the next 24 months. This variable is defined
as long as one observation is available (either a crisis or noncrisis month) in the relevant 24-month period.
Secondly, the weighted sum of indicators signaling is calculated provided that data on at least one of the indi-
cators is available. The weighted-sum-based probabilities are calculated using the same principle.
46Unlike Kaminsky (1998a), we use only the good indicators, that is, those with noise-to-signal ratio
less than one.
47See Table 2 footnotes for precise definitions of “correctly called” and related terms.Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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Table A2. Goodness of Fit of KLR Model—In Sample
Cutoff of 50 Percent
Goodness-of-Fit Tablea
Augmented with Current
Original Specification Account and M2/reserves
Actual Actual
Predicted Tranquil Crash Total Predicted Tranquil Crash Total
Tranquil 5,541 1,114 6,655 Tranquil 5,581 1,115 6,696
Crash 90 115 205 Crash 50 114 164
Total 5,631 1,229 6,860 Total 5,631 1,229 6,860
Summary Statistics
Original Augmented
Percent of observations correctly called 82 83
Percent of crises correctly calledb 9 9
Percent of tranquil periods correctly calledc 98 99
False alarms as a percent of total alarmsd 44 30
Probability of crisis given:
an alarme 56 70
no alarmf 17 17
Cutoff of 25 Percent
Goodness-of-Fit Tablea
Augmented with Current
Original Specification Account and M2/reserves
Actual Actual
Predicted Tranquil Crash Total Predicted Tranquil Crash Total
Tranquil 4,790 728 5,518 Tranquil 4,568 658 5,227
Crash 841 501 1,342 Crash 1,063 571 1,634
Total 5,631 1,229 6,860 Total 5,631 1,229 6,860
Summary Statistics
Original Augmented
Percent of observations correctly called 77 75
Percent of crises correctly calledb 41 46
Percent of tranquil periods correctly calledc 85 81
False alarms as a percent of total alarmsd 63 65
Probability of crisis given:
an alarme 37 35
no alarmf 13 13
aTable shows number of observations.
bA precrisis period is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above the
cutoff probability and a crisis ensues within 24 months.
cA tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is below the
cutoff probability and no crisis ensues within 24 months. 
dA false alarm is an observation with an estimated probability of crisis above the cutoff (an
alarm) not followed by a crisis within 24 months.
eThis is the number of precrisis periods correctly called as a share of total predicted precrisis periods.
fThis is the number of periods where tranquility is predicted and a crisis actually ensues as a
share of total predicted tranquil periods (observations for which the predicted probability of crisis
is below the cutoff).Frankel and Rose (1996) Probit Model Using Multi-Country Sample
Table A3 (column 1) presents our reproduction of the FR benchmark probit regression, using
the same sample of annual data for over 100 developing countries for 1970–92. FR conclude
from this and a variety of similar regressions that the probability of a crisis increases when out-
put growth is low, domestic credit growth is high, foreign interest rates are high, and FDI as a
proportion of total debt is low. They also found support for the prediction that crashes tend to
occur when reserves are low and the real exchange rate is overvalued.48
We made several revisions to the FR benchmark regression before updating it to 1996. As
with the other papers, we used currently available, and hence revised, data from the same World
Bank source as FR.49 In addition, we corrected an error in the original FR calculation of the
overvaluation variable.50
The net effect of all these changes is shown in the second regression of Table A3. Overall,
the model performs somewhat better than the original FR regression. The corrected overvalua-
tion variable now has a much stronger and more significant effect. Higher northern (OECD)
growth now significantly decreases the risk of crisis, and the effect of foreign interest rates is
smaller and insignificant.51
We now estimate the model through 1996 for purposes of generating predictions for 1997.
As the third regression in Table A3 shows, the results are similar to the 1970 to 1992 regres-
sions. A large share of debt which is concessional now reduces the risk of crisis.52
Next, we change the sample. The sample of countries used in the original FR regressions
is substantially different from those in the KLR and STV regressions. In particular, a large
number of least-developed countries (such as the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance) and small island economies (for example, São Tomé, Cape Verde, and Vanuatu) are
included. Because of concerns that crises in these countries may have different determinants
and to maximize comparability with the other papers, we have rerun the FR regression over a
smaller sample of 41 countries made up of all developing countries with per capita incomes
above $1,000 and population above 1 million for which there are data.53
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48Although the authors highlight the importance of low reserves and overvaluation in their conclu-
sion, their results show significant effects were not robust and were found in fewer than half of the spec-
ifications they tested. The result that faster domestic growth reduces the probability of crisis is also not
robust, as illustrated by the benchmark regression itself. 
49This changed not only some of the data but also the sample, because some of the data that had
previously been available, largely from the early 1970s, are now considered to be of unacceptable
quality, while other formerly unavailable observations now had data. The net effect is to increase the
number of observations from 780 in FR to 881, though the overlap of common data points is only 729
observations.
50We also made two other technical modifications. First, we used percent changes instead of log dif-
ferences in comparing the devaluations with the 25 percent crisis threshold. Second, we changed the
implementation of the “windowing” procedure to more closely match the FR intent of ensuring that only
the first of a sequence of crises was counted in the sample. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), who
recommended these two modifications.
51For the overvaluation variable itself, the correction is the source of the improvement. For the other
variables, the changes in sample resulting from the data revision are more important than the data revi-
sions themselves, the changes in the windowing procedure and definition of crisis, or the correction of the
overvaluation variable in driving these changes in results.
52For purposes of predicting 1997 outcomes, we also estimate this regression with the government
budget as a share of GDP excluded from this regression, because this variable is not available for 1996 as
would be required for forecasting 1997. This omission makes little difference.
53Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) raise these sample issues and extract this smaller sample, for which
they get improved results compared with FR.Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo
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Table A3. Frankel and Rose: Probit Estimates of Probability
of a Currency Crash
Original 1970–92 Sample 1970–96 Sample
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A
FR benchmark revised FR benchmark
dF/dx |z|a dF/dx |z|a dF/dx |z|a
Commercial bank share
of total debt 0.03 0.2 –0.07 –0.6 0.03 –0.3
Concessional share –0.14 –2.1 –0.12 –1.6 –0.13 –1.9 *
Variable rate share –0.03 0.2 0.20 1.5 0.13 1.1
Short-term share 0.23 2.0 0.28 2.3 ** 0.27 2.2 **
FDI/debt –0.31 –2.5 –0.53 –3.7 *** –0.46 –3.3 ***
Public sector share 0.19 2.2 0.18 2.0 ** 0.16 1.8 *
Multilateral share –0.06 –0.8 0.08 1.0 0.06 0.8
Debt/GNP –0.04 –1.7 –0.02 –1.5 –0.02 –1.4
Reserves/imports –0.01 –3.4 –0.01 –3.3 *** –0.01 –3.9 ***
Current account/GDP 0.02 0.2 –0.03 –0.3 –0.02 –0.2
Overvaluationb 0.08 2.5 0.15 4.0 ** 0.12 3.3 ***
Government budget surplus/
GDP 0.16 1.1 0.10 0.7 0.11 0.8
Domestic credit growth 0.10 3.2 0.08 3.8 *** 0.08 3.7 ***
GDP growth rate –0.16 –1.3 –0.07 –1.5 –0.08 –1.6
Foreign interest rate 0.80 2.6 0.48 1.4 0.33 1.0
Northern (OECD) growth –0.85 –1.5 –1.17 –1.9 *  –1.52 –2.5 **
Sample size 780 881 940
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.15
Goodness of Fit
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A
Tranquil Crash Total Tranquil Crash Total Tranquil Crash Total
Cutoff probability
of 50 percentc
Predicted tranquility 707 64 771 777 88 865 830 97 927
Predicted crash 4 5 9 7 9 16 5 8 13
Total 711 69 780 784 97 881 835 105 940
Cutoff probability
of 25 percentd
Predicted tranquility 678 52 730 743 62 805 792 72 864
Predicted crash 33 17 50 41 35 76 43 33 76
Total 711 69 780 784 97 881 835 105 940
aOne, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
bDefined as the deviation from the average real exchange rate over the period.
cA crisis is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above 50 percent if a cri-
sis ensues within 24 months. A tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of
crisis is below 50 percent and there is no crisis within 24 months.
dA crisis is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above 25 percent if a cri-
sis ensues within 24 months. A tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability of
crisis is below 25 percent and there is no crisis within 24 months.The results are broadly similar, as regression 1 of Table 4 shows. The most notable changes
are that the ratio of reserves to imports is no longer significant whereas the current account and
the fiscal balance now are. 
The main text discusses our consideration of some alternative explanatory variables.
Regression 2 of Table 4 includes the ratio to the reserves to M2 and the degree of openness of
the economy, as a result of this specification search. This model suggests that the probability of
a crash increases when concessional debt and FDI are small and public sector debt large as a
share of total external debt, the ratio of reserves/M2 is low, the current account deficit is large,
the real exchange rate is overvalued, domestic credit growth is high, foreign interest rates are
high, and the country is not open to trade.
Model 3A of Table A3 is close to the original FR specification, with some corrections and
minor revisions, while model 2 of Table 4 is our augmented specification using a more homo-
geneous sample. The diagnostic statistics show that, in-sample, these models rarely generate a
predicted probability of crash above 50 percent. Model 3A correctly predicts only 8 out of the
105 crashes; model 2 (Table 4) does better, predicting one-third of the crashes in the sample.
When an estimated probability of above 25 percent followed by a crash is considered success,
the results look better. Model 2, for example, generates a probability above 25 percent before
63 percent of crises. About half of warnings defined this way (41 out of 79) were not followed
by a crash.
The FR models thus show some promise for predicting crises based on this in-sample
assessment. There is a fair amount of parameter stability across samples, and many sensible
variables are significant predictors of crisis. The overall explanatory power is fairly low, though
our modifications lead to some improvement here.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) Cross-Country Regressions
The text discussed reproduction of the original STV benchmark regression, using their data,54
as well as results using revised data and estimating over the common 23-country sample (Table
5, regressions 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We also considered a revised specification based on a
different definition of the real exchange rate (Table 5, regression 4).
Table A4 shows some further variants of the STV regressions for the 1994–95 sample.
Regression 5 is another variant on the definition of the real exchange rate variable, measuring
RER as the level of the real exchange rate in 1994 compared with its average over the 1986 to
1989 period. It is also quite similar to the benchmark specification in Table 5, regression 3. 
The definitions of low reserves and weak fundamentals in terms of which quartile of the
sample the country finds itself are somewhat arbitrary. For this reason, STV vary the defini-
tion of low reserves and weak fundamentals so that countries in different fractions of the
sample qualify. For example, regression 6 of Table A4 reproduces the STV results for the
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54Regression 1 differs slightly from the published STV benchmark, mainly because we have corrected
an error in the calculation of RER for Taiwan Province of China, in STV. The resulting differences are sta-
tistically, numerically, and economically small. In addition, the data used both in the STV benchmark and
regression 1 differ slightly from that described and published in STV. First, the data published in STV (but
not that used in their regressions) contain several typographical errors, which we have corrected with the help
of the authors. Second, here and in the STV regression the lending boom variable was calculated differently
for Peru than for the other countries and as defined in the appendix of STV. Specifically, LB is defined as
the growth from 1990 through 1994 in the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. For Peru,
however, the base year actually used is apparently 1991. This is presumably because the hyperinflation and
stabilization of 1989/1990 led to a tiny base of credit/GDP and would have resulted in a large outlier for Peru
if calculated as defined in STV. Third, the measure of reserves for South Africa apparently includes gold

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.case where “low reserves” is defined as having a reserves/M2 ratio in the bottom half of the
sample, while “weak fundamentals” is having low reserves or an exchange rate depreciation
in the lower half of the sample. The main results continue to hold. Regressions 7 and 8 of
Table A4 present the reestimation of regression 5 with revised data and correcting the Taiwan
Province of China crisis variable. Unlike with the quartile regressions, this changes the
results: most important, RER with low reserves and weak fundamentals (b2 + b4 + b6) now
has the wrong sign, though it is insignificant.55
A number of the STV results are not robust to the data revisions that have taken place since
their estimations and to the addition of three countries to the sample. The fit of the models is
generally poorer and the main hypotheses receive mixed support at best. 
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